We develop a model of electoral selection and accountability in the presence of mainstream and alternative media outlets. In addition to standard high and low competence types, the incumbent may be an aspiring autocrat, who controls the mainstream media and will cause substantial harm if not removed from office. Alternative media can help voters identify and remove aspiring autocrats and can enable voters to focus on honest mainstream media assessments of incumbents' competence. But malicious alternative media that peddle false conspiracy theories about the incumbent and the mainstream media can induce voters to mistakenly remove nonautocratic incumbents, which in turn demotivates incumbent effort and undermines accountability. The alternative media is most dangerous when it is sufficiently credible that voters pay attention to it, but sufficiently likely to be malicious that it undermines accountability.
whether the mainstream media is captured and whether the alternative media is reliable. 1
Research on autocracies and fragile democracies includes empirical analyses of governmentcontrolled media (for a review, see Enikolopov and Petrova 2015) as well as theories of propaganda and censorship (e.g., Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin 2009; Gehlbach and Sonin 2014; Lorentzen 2014; Cheah 2016; and Gehlbach, Sonin, and Svolik 2016) . Very few models analyze accountability in weak democracies (though see Svolik 2013) .
Our focus is closest to Guriev and Treisman's (2018) model of propaganda and censorship by a regime that wishes to appear competent. However, they focus on countries that are already non-democratic, in which citizens are only concerned about whether the ruler is competent, not whether she will subvert democracy and move towards autocracy. Another difference is that criticism of the incumbent in their model is always accurate, whereas a key parameter in our analysis is the reliability of the alternative media.
Model
Consider a model of policymaking and elections, with five actors: the incumbent policymaker, replacement policymaker, mainstream media, alternative media, and voter. There are two equally-likely states of the world, ω ∈ {0, 1}. The incumbent may learn ω and chooses a policy x ∈ {0, 1}. Then the mainstream media announces a message m ∈ {0, 1} about the policy it believes is correct. The alternative media simultaneously issues a report r ∈ {C, NC} about whether the mainstream media is engaged in a conspiracy with an incumbent who is an aspiring autocrat. Finally, the voter observes x, m, and r but not the true state ω, and decides between the incumbent and replacement.
The incumbent can be a high, low, or autocratic type, θ I ∈ {H, L, A} . High and low competence types are standard in the accountability literature. The autocratic type is novel-she controls the mainstream media and if she is re-elected she will consolidate her power and deliver a negative payoff to voters. The incumbent is autocratic with probability α. Conditional on not being autocratic, she is a high type with probability π. Low and autocratic types only know the prior Pr (ω = 1) = 1 2 and cannot acquire additional information. 2 Type H can exert effort, at cost k, to learn the state of the world before choosing policy. Politicians get an ego-rent 1 if they win the election.
The mainstream media is either truthful or propagandist. If truthful, it non-strategically 1 Outside of the accountability literature, advice from experts with uncertain biases has been examined in models of electoral competition (Chan and Suen 2009) and policy advice (Minozzi 2011) . Whistleblowing about wrongdoing has been examined in many settings (Chassang and Padró i Miquel 2016) , including models tailored to bureaucracies (Ting 2008) and judicial hierarchies (Beim, Hirsch, and Kastellec 2014) .
2 Equilibria are unchanged if autocratic types can have high or low competence for first period policymaking. A competent autocratic type has no reason to exert effort, because she can induce the mainstream media to produce propaganda praising her policies. issues a report m ∈ {0, 1} that matches the true state ω with probability q ∈ 1 2 , 1 . The media is a propagandist if and only if the incumbent is autocratic, in which case it always reports that that the incumbent's policy choice was correct, m = x.
The alternative media is either truthful or malicious. If truthful, it non-strategically reports r = C, i.e., that the incumbent is autocratic and there is conspiracy, if and only if this is indeed the case. A malicious alternative media always reports r = C. A central parameter in our analysis is the probability that the alternative media is malicious, φ ∈ [0, 1].
After observing x, m and r, the voter elects the incumbent or replacement. The voter gets utility 1 (in an unmodeled second period) from re-electing a high-type incumbent, 0 from a low type, and −a from an autocratic type. As is standard in accountability models, the replacement doesn't take any actions unless elected. We set U R ∈ [−a, 1] as the voter's exogenous expected utility from the replacement.
We characterize Perfect Bayesian equilibria that are symmetric with respect to policies 0 and 1. Symmetry implies that low and autocratic incumbents flip coins to choose policy.
Other components of an equilibrium are: (1) the high-type incumbent's effort decision and policy choice, and (2) the voter's belief about the incumbent, as well as his election decision. For technical simplicity, we assume that a high-type incumbent who is indifferent exerts effort and a voter who is indifferent removes the incumbent.
Baseline
To establish a baseline, suppose there is no alternative media. We say there is accountability if two conditions hold: (1) high-type incumbents exert effort to choose policy in the voter's interest and (2) the incumbent is removed from office if m = x. We characterize equilibria with accountability wherever it is possible, as well as what happens when accountability is impossible. Note that the two conditions for accountability are mutually reinforcing: a high type exerts effort to choose good policies and earn praise from the mainstream media, and the fact that she exerts effort means the media message is informative about her type.
Voter inferences are complicated by the possibility that the incumbent is autocratic and the mainstream media is a propagandist. If the incumbent is very likely to be autocratic, the media message is meaningless. But if the autocratic type isn't too likely or too harmful, the possibility of propaganda doesn't overwhelm the positive information conveyed by the report m = x. If high-type incumbents choose x = ω and low and autocratic types flip coins to choose policy, the voter's expected utility from re-electing the incumbent is:
where l := α/ (1 − α) is the likelihood that the incumbent is autocratic rather than nonautocratic. On the other hand, when m = x the voter knows the incumbent is nonautocratic, so his utility from re-electing her is his belief about her being type H:
If the incumbent and replacement are similarly appealing ex ante, i.e., U R ∈ [U, U ), the voter bases his decision on the mainstream media message. Accountability also requires that the high-type incumbent exert effort. If she doesn't exert effort, then m = x with probability 1 2 , but with effort this probability increases to q. Thus the effort cost must be less than q − 1 2 . In what follows, we focus on parameters such that it is possible to have accountability for some values of U R . Assumption 1. k ≤ q − 1 2 , and α and a are sufficiently small that U < U .
The following result summarizes the baseline.
Proposition 1. With only the mainstream media.
, accountability is possible. High type incumbents exert effort to choose x = ω and the voter re-elects the incumbent iff m = x.
2. Otherwise accountability is impossible and the voter re-elects the incumbent iff she is ex ante better than the replacement, i.e., (1 − α) π − aα > U R .
Alternative Media
We now analyze the full model, in which the alternative media reports on whether the incumbent is an aspiring autocrat. Recall that the alternative media is either truthful or malicious, in the sense that it always claims the incumbent is autocratic. To assess the effects of alternative media, we ask two questions. First, how does the alternative media affect the incumbent's policymaking effort? Second, how does it affect electoral selection, both in the sense of re-electing high-type incumbents and in the sense of removing autocratic ones? We provide intuitive answers to these questions and then state equilibria in Proposition 2.
Accountability The probability φ that the alternative media is malicious plays a key role in determining whether accountability is possible. To see this, we begin with situations with accountability in the baseline model, i.e., U R ∈ [U , U) from Proposition 1. If φ = 0, the alternative media perfectly reveals whether the incumbent is autocratic, and there is an accountability equilibrium in which re-election requires m = x and r = NC. In contrast, if φ = 1, the alternative media always reports r = C, alleging a conspiracy, so there is an accountability equilibrium in which the alternative media is ignored and re-election is based solely on the mainstream media's message, as in the baseline model. For intermediate values, φ ∈ (0, 1), the effect of alternative media is twofold. The first effect concerns the high-type incumbent's effort. If re-election requires m = x and r = NC, then increases in φ demotivate the incumbent, because effort is only rewarded if the alternative media is truthful. To induce effort requires k ≤ q − 1 2 (1 − φ) or, equivalently,
The second effect concerns whether the voter uses information from the alternative media.
The voter removes the incumbent upon hearing m = x and r = C if
This requires that the alternative media be sufficiently reliable,
Otherwise the voter ignores the alternative media.
Combining these effects, we see how φ affects accountability. If φ v ≤ φ e , then if there is accountability in the baseline, there is also accountability with an alternative media (Proposition 2.2(a)). The voter attends to the alternative media if φ ≤ φ v and ignores it otherwise.
Things are more interesting if φ v > φ e (Proposition 2.2(b)). If φ ≤ φ e or φ > φ v , there is accountability and the voter attends to the alternative media in the first case and ignores it in the second case. But for intermediate values
Under what circumstances does the presence of the alternative media disrupt accountability? First, the replacement must be moderately appealing compared to the incumbent,
. Second, the alternative media must be sufficiently trustworthy that the voter attends to it (φ ≤ φ v ) but sufficiently untrustworthy that the incumbent's fear of being
. Thus, disruption of accountability due to the presence of an alternative media occurs when policymaking is difficult, in the sense that it is costly for the incumbent to learn the correct policy that serve the voter's interest.
In other situations, the alternative media can have positive effects on accountability.
Proposition 1 shows that in the baseline model, when the replacement is highly appealing (U R ≥ U ), accountability is impossible and the voter removes the incumbent even when m = x. The alternative media reveals additional information, because r = NC means the incumbent is nonautocratic. If the high-type incumbent exerts effort, the voter's expected utility from re-electing the incumbent after m = x and r = NC is:
As is shown in Proposition 2.3, the presence of the alternative media makes accountability possible when the replacement is reasonably highly-appealing and false criticism is not so likely as to demotivate effort, i.e.,
Selection We now analyze how the probability φ that the alternative media is malicious affects selection, starting with cases where the replacement is moderately appealing:
there is accountability and the voter listens to both media outlets. Increasing φ worsens selection, as nonautocratic incumbents are more frequently falsely accused and removed from office. For φ > φ v , there is accountability but the alternative media is ignored, so local changes in φ don't affect selection.
Things are more dramatic if φ v > φ e , because changes in φ can affect the incumbent's effort. At φ = φ e , the equilibrium transitions from one with accountability to one without accountability. Thus as φ crosses the threshold of φ e , the voter completely loses the benefit of selecting based the mainstream media message. However, as the alternative media becomes more unreliable and φ increases above φ v , accountability is restored, and the voter is able to benefit from selecting based solely on the mainstream media message.
We also briefly note how φ affects selection based on the mainstream media report when
With an unappealing replacement (U R < U), there is no accountability and the voter never selects based on the mainstream media message. With a highly-appealing replacement (U R ∈ [U , U)), there is accountability if and only if the alternative media is not demotivating, i.e., φ ≤ φ e , in which case the voter uses information from both media outlets.
Finally, we note that absent accountability, the voter benefits from selecting based on the alternative media report if two conditions hold. First, the alternative media must be sufficiently trustworthy for the voter to remove the incumbent when r = C. This requires
Second, the incumbent must be sufficiently likely to be a high type for the voter to re-elect her when he sees r = NC and learns that she is nonautocratic but doesn't learn anything about her competence. This reqires π > U R or, equivalently, φ s > 0.
Voter welfare Our results on accountability and selection establish non-monotonicity of voter welfare as we vary the probability that the alternative media is malicious. The voter can be better off with a highly unreliable alternative media, which he ignores, than with a somewhat reliable one that cannot be ignored but demotivates the incumbent's policy effort.
Summary The following proposition summarizes equilibria with accountability whenever it is possible as well as what happens in equilibrium when accountability is impossible.
Proposition 2. With an alternative media.
1. For U R < U , the incumbent never exerts effort and two situations can happen: ii. if φ > φ v , the incumbent exerts effort and is re-elected iff m = x.
(b) If φ v > φ e , three situations can happen:
i. if φ ≤ φ e , the incumbent exerts effort and is re-elected iff m = x and r = NC;
ii. if φ ∈ (φ e , φ v ], the incumbent exerts no effort, and is either never re-elected
(a) if φ ≤ φ e , the incumbent exerts effort and is re-elected iff m = x and r = NC;
(b) if φ > φ e , the incumbent exerts no effort and two situations can happen:
i. If U R < π, the incumbent is re-elected iff r = NC;
ii. If U R ≥ π, the incumbent is never re-elected;
4. For U R ≥ U, the incumbent exerts no effort and is never re-elected.
Discussion
We conclude by briefly discussing additional implications of our model. It is straightforward to show that the voter's belief about the probability that the mainstream media is truthful decreases when the alternative media alleges that it is a propaganda vehicle for the incumbent. This is consistent with the decline in trust in the media at a time when there is a proliferation of alternative media sources that disparage the mainstream media. At a broader level, our model contributes to the growing literature on democratic backsliding and autocratization in countries such as Brazil, Ecuador, Hungary, India, Poland, Russia, Turkey, and Venezuela. Backsliding takes many forms, as aspiring autocrats undermine multiple institutions, including elections, opposition parties, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary. Scholars have identified behind-the-scenes control of the media as one of the most common forms of backsliding (Bermeo 2016; Mechkova, Lührmann, and Lindberg 2017) , and evidence on bribes by Peru's Fujimori shows that he placed an especially high value on the media (McMillan and Zoido 2004) . Alternative media and civic organizations can sometimes counteract such actions, serving as independent information sources and undermining support for autocratic rulers (Knight and Tribin 2018) . However, as noted by Bermeo (2016) , they often face a credibility problem because rulers may accuse them of being special interests, representatives of a discredited old order, or tools of foreign powers.
Another application of our model is to fake news that alleges conspiracies between politicians and the mainstream media. Fake news has been studied by empiricists who analyze effects on voting and electoral outcomes (e.g., Allcott and Gentzkow 2017) . Theoretical analyses include Allcott and Gentzkow's verbal theory, Yea's (2018) Bayesian persuasion game, and Taylor's (2019) model of message substitution, all of which analyze the generation of fake news as well as how it affects citizens' beliefs and behavior.
Our model suggests that the effect of fake news goes beyond fooling voters into making errors. Rather, fake news, like other malicious alternative media sources, can undermine accountability, disincentivize incumbent policymaking effort, and make it impossible for voters to assess an incumbent based on her policy record. This implication dovetails with Jee, Lueders, and Myrick's (2019) argument that fake news and propaganda contribute to democratic backsliding and "negatively affect [-] citizens' ability to make informed choices in elections and to hold their elected representatives accountable." Our analysis makes it possible to determine when alternative media will have a negative effect, when it will have positive effect, and when it will have no effect. The alternative media is most beneficial when it is honest and known to be honest. In contrast, an alternative media that is known to be malicious is not much of a problem, because voters ignore it. What is most problematic is an alternative media that is sufficiently likely to be honest that voters pay attention to it, but sufficiently likely to be malicious that it interferes with selection, undermines incumbent incentives, and destroys accountability.
Appendix: Proofs
For any parameter values there exists an equilibrium in which the type H incumbent does not exert effort. We analyze whether it is possible to have an equilibrium with accountability.
In the proofs, we use µ H and µ A to denote voter beliefs about the probability that the incumbent is type H or A.
Before we prove the results, three things are worth noting. First, we have assumed that if the incumbent is autocratic the alternative media always reports m = x, i.e., it says that the incumbent chose the correct policy. A natural question is whether a strategic propagandist who seeks to maximize the incumbent's probability of re-election has an incentive to instead report m = x. In the equilibria that we characterize, a strategic propagandist can never help the incumbent by doing this.
Second, although we have assumed symmetry, which directly implies that type L and A incumbents choose each policy x ∈ {0, 1} with probability 1 2 , Lemma XX in the Additional Results section at the end of the appendix shows that our results do not depend on this assumption.
Third, we note that our assumption that a type H incumbent who is indifferent about effort exerts effort and a voter who is indifferent removes the incumbent only affects our analysis for knife-edge parameter cases, specifically k ∈ q − 1 2 , q − 1 2 (1 − φ) , U R ∈ U , U, U, π , and φ ∈ {φ e , φ v , φ s } . These are the only parameters for which these actors can be indifferent when each of them plays pure strategies.
Proof of Proposition 1
Part 1. We first calculate voter beliefs, then turn to voter and incumbent strategies.
Suppose type H exerts effort and chooses x = ω. Recall that the mainstream media reports m = ω with probability q if the incumbent is type H or L and always reports m = x if the incumbent is type A.
For voter beliefs when m = x: with probability (1 − α) π the incumbent is type H in which case m = x with probability q, with probability (1 − α) (1 − π) the incumbent is type L in which case m = x with probability 1 2 , and with probability α the incumbent is type A in which case m = x always. Thus, using the notation l := α 1−α , Bayes' Rule implies that
For beliefs when m = x: with probability (1 − α) π the incumbent is type H, in which case m = x with probability (1 − q); with probability (1 − α) (1 − π) the incumbent is type L, in which case m = x with probability 1 2 ; and with probability α the incumbent is type A, in which case the media never reports m = x. Thus
The voter gets utility 1 from type H, 0 from type L, and −a from type A, so his expected utility from re-electing when m = x is
and his expected utility from re-electing when m = x is
Thus if the voter's utility from the replacement is U R ∈ [U , U), he re-elects the incumbent iff m = x.
For type H, given the voter's strategy, she is re-elected with probability 1 2 if she doesn't exert effort and with probability q if she exerts effort, so she exerts effort if the cost satisfies k ≤ q − 1 2 . Part 2. To prove this part of the proposition we first assume accountability and derive a contradiction. If type H exerts effort and chooses x = ω, then for U R < U the voter always re-elects the incumbent, so type H will not exert effort. Likewise, if type H exerts effort and chooses x = ω, then for U R ≥ U the voter always removes the incumbent so type H will not exert effort.
Given that the incumbent does not exert effort and her choice of x does not reveal anything about her type, the voter's expected utility from the incumbent is the same regardless of whether m = x or m = x. With probability (1 − α) π she is type H, with probability (1 − α) (1 − π) she is L, and with probability α she is A. So the voter's expected utility from the incumbent is
and the voter re-elects the incumbent iff this is strictly greater than U R .
To set up the proof of Proposition 2, we develop three lemmas to characterize voter beliefs, voter best responses, and incumbent best responses. Proof. All of the results follow directly from Bayes's Rule. We note a few details for different parts of the lemma. 1(a). The alternative media reports r = NC only if the voter is not type A. Conditional on r = NC, with probability π the incumbent is type H, in which case m = x = ω with probability q. With probability (1 − π) the incumbent is type L, in which case m = x with probability 1 2 . 1(b). Recall that the alternative media reports r = C for types H and L with probability φ (the probability that it is malicious) and it always reports r = C when the incumbent is type A. So with probability (1 − α) πqφ the incumbent is type H and the media reports are m = x and r = C, with probability (1 − α) (1 − π) 1 2 φ the incumbent is type L and the reports are m = x and r = C, and with probability α the incumbent is type A and the reports are m = x and r = C. Applying Bayes's Rule and using l = α 1−α yields the result. 1(c). When m = x the voter knows the incumbent is not type A, and straightforwardly updates on the competence of the incumbent.
2(a). The alternative media announcement r = NC eliminates the possibility that the incumbent is type A. Because type H does not exert effort, the voter doesn't update about the relative likelihood of type H and L based on m.
2(b). The voter doesn't update based on m, but does update based on r about the probability that the incumbent is nonautocratic (in which case r = C with probability φ) or autocratic (in which case r = C with probability 1).
Lemma 2. The voter's best responses to type H's effort choice are as follows.
1. Suppose type H exerts effort. 
(c) When m = x, regardless of r the voter reelects the incumbent iff U R < U = π(1−q) π(1−q)+(1−π) 1 2 .
Suppose type H does not exert effort.
(a) When r = NC, regardless of m the voter reelects the incumbent iff U R < π or, equivalently, φ s = (a+U R )l π−U R > 0. Proof. The voter gets utility 1 from type H, 0 from type L, and −a from type A, so his expected utility from re-electing the incumbent is
The parts of the lemma follow from the corresponding parts of Lemma 1 and algebra.
Lemma 3. Type H's best responses to the voter's reelection rule are as follows.
1. If the voter re-elects the incumbent iff m = x and r = NC, then type H exerts effort
2. If the voter re-elects the incumbent iff m = x, then type H exerts effort iff k ≤ q − 1 2 .
3. If the voter re-elects the incumbent iff r = NC, then type H does not exert effort.
4. If the voter always re-elects the incumbent or never re-elects the incumbent, then type H does not exert effort.
Proof. For Part 1: with effort type H's expected utility is q (1 − φ) − k, and without effort it is 1 2 (1 − φ), which yields the condition. For Part 2: with effort type H's expected utility is q − k, and without effort it is 1 2 , which yields the condition. For Parts 3 and 4, type H does not exert effort because effort is costly and does not affect the probability of re-election.
Proof of Proposition 2
For each parameter region, we conjecture that the incumbent behaves accountably in the following sense: type H exerts effort and chooses x = ω, whereas L and A choose each
x ∈ {0, 1} with probability 1 2 . We then characterize the voter's best response. If it's optimal for type H to exert effort given the voter's best response, there is an equilibrium with accountability. Otherwise there isn't, and we characterize what happens in equilibrium when all incumbent types choose each policy with probability 1 2 . Note that U , U v , U s < U < U and that U , U s < π < U. Proposition 2.1 Suppose U R < U and the incumbent behaves accountably. By Lemma 2.1(c), the voter re-elects the incumbent if m = x. Thus type H has no incentive to exert effort, so there cannot be an equilibrium with accountability. Now suppose all incumbent types choose each policy with probability 1 2 . Because U R < U < π, Lemma 2.2(a) implies that when r = NC the incumbent is re-elected. Lemma 2.2(b) shows that when r = C the voter's best response depends on whether φ > φ s , thus completing the proof of Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 2.2 Suppose U R ∈ [U, U ) and the incumbent behaves accountably. The voter's best response depends on whether φ > φ v . Consider two cases.
Case 1. If φ ≤ φ v , then U v ≤ U R < U , so Lemma 2.1 implies that the incumbent is reelected iff m = x and r = NC. By Lemma 3.1, it is optimal for type H to exert effort iff φ ≤ φ e , and combining yields the existence of equilibria with accountability as in Proposition 2.2(a)i and 2.2(b)i. On the other hand, if φ ∈ (φ e , φ v ], then Lemma 3.1 implies that it is not optimal for the incumbent to exert effort given the voter's best response. Without incumbent effort, Lemma 2.2 characterizes voter behavior for Proposition 2.2(b)ii.
Case 2. If φ > φ v , then U R < U v < U, so Lemma 2.1 implies that the incumbent is reelected iff m = x. From Lemma 3.2, it is optimal for type H to exert effort iff k ≤ q − 1 2 , which holds true under Assumption 1. Combining yields Proposition 2.2(a)ii and 2.2(b)iii.
Proposition 2.3 Suppose U R ∈ [U , U) and the incumbent behaves accountably. Since U > U v and hence U R > U v , Lemma 2.1 implies that the incumbent is reelected iff m = x
Additional Results
The following lemma shows that our restriction to equilibria that are symmetric with respect to x ∈ {0, 1} does not affect our results about accountability.
Lemma 4. If there exists an equilibrium in which type H exerts effort and chooses x = ω then there exists an equilibrium in which types L and A choose each x ∈ {0, 1} with probability 1/2, type H exerts effort and chooses x = ω, and voter behavior is unchanged.
Let p L and p A be the probability that types L and A choose x = 1 in the original equilibrium. We show that for any such equilibrium it is possible to change these probabilities top L =p A = 1/2, while leaving all other equilibrium strategies unchanged. This requires showing that types L and A are indifferent between x ∈ {0, 1} so that they can mix. It also requires showing that although voter beliefs may change, the voter's strategies in the original equilibrium remain best responses. This, in turn implies that incentives for type H to exert effort and choose x = ω are unchanged.
We start by considering incetives for a type A incumbent. For type A, the voter always observes m = x and r = C, because the mainstream media is propagandist and either type of alternative media reports r = C when the incumbent is type A. Thus the only voter information sets that matter for type A are m = x = 0, r = C and m = x = 1, r = C. WLOG suppose the voter's expected utility in these two information sets is ordered as EU V (reelect|m = x = 0, r = C) ≤ EU V (reelect|m = x = 1, r = C) . We consider two cases.
Case 1: EU V (reelect|m = x = 0, r = C) ≤ U R < EU V (reelect|m = x = 1, r = C) . In this case, type A is re-elected iff she chooses x = 1, so p A = 1. Using this, along with p L and type H's behavior in the conjectured equilibrium, voter beliefs when x = 0 are µ H (m = x = 0, r = NC) = µ H (m = x = 0, r = C)
= µ A (m = x = 0, r = NC) = µ A (m = x = 0, r = C) = 0.
Given these beliefs we have U R ≥ EU V (reelect|m = x = 0, r = C) = EU V (reelect|m = x = 0, r = NC) > EU V (reelect|m = 1, x = 0, r = C) = EU V (reelect|m = 1, x = 0, r = NC), so the voter never re-elects the incumbent when x = 0. This in turn implies that all incumbent types choose x = 1 and type H does not exert effort. Thus there cannot be an equilibrium of the form conjectured in this case.
Case 2a: U R < EU V (reelect|m = x = 0, r = C) and 2b: U R ≥ EU V (reelect|m = x = 1, r = C) . The arguments for these cases are similar so we consider Case 2a.
We first analyze type A's behavior and then turn to type L.
In the original equilibrium with p A and p L , because U R < EU V (reelect|m = x = 0, r = C) ≤ EU V (reelect|m = x = 1, r = C) the voter always re-elects the incumbent when m = x and r = C, i.e., Pr (reelect|m = x = 1, r = C) = Pr (reelect|m = x = 0, r = C) = 1. So type A is indifferent between x = 0 and x = 1. We show that ifp L =p A = 1/2, type A is still always re-elected and hence is indifferent.
Voter beliefs in the original equilibrium are
We use voter expected utilities in the original equilibrium to characterize voter behavior whenp L =p A = 1/2. In the original equilibrium,
and
Equations 1 and 2 imply that for any z ∈ [0, 1]
In particular for z = 1/2,
which can be written, usingp L =p A = 1 2 , as
Note that withp L =p A = 1 2 , the voter's expected utility is EU V (reelect|m = x = 1, r = C) = EU V (reelect|m = x = 0, r = C) = πqφ−a2lp A πqφ+(1−π)p L φ+2lp A . So voter behavior (always reelecting the incumbent) is unchanged in these information sets when type L and A's behavior is changed from p L and p A top L =p A = 1 2 . Hence type A, who only cares about voter behavior in these two information sets, is still indifferent between x = 0 and x = 1 and can mix.
We now turn to type L and show that changing from p L and p A top L =p A = 1 2 leaves incentives for type L unaffected given voter best responses.
Note that the probability that m = x or m = x and the probability that r = C or r = NC are unaffected by whether type L chooses x = 0 or x = 1.
Also, note that from the argument above about type A, the voter always re-elects when m = x and r = C for either p L and p A orp L =p A = 1 2 , so as we analyze incentives for type L we can restrict our attention to other information sets.
In all other information sets, voter beliefs and utility from re-electing the incumbent only depend on p L , not p A (because for type A, m = x and r = C always). These beliefs are always ordered, with the voter having a higher opinion of an incumbent who chooses the policy that is less likely to be chosen by type L. Specifically, the voter believes the incumbent is not type A, 
and the ordering only depends on whether p L > (<) (=) 1 2 . Thus Equation 3 puts a lot of structure on type L's incentives. We consider several subcases. Subcase 2ai. Equation 3 holds with equality in the original equilibrium with p L and p A . This requires p L = 1 2 , so forp L = 1 2 the voter's best response is unchanged. Also type L must be indifferent given the voter's behavior and can mix. Subcase 2aii. Equation 3 is a strict inequality in the original equilibrium, WLOG suppose that the inequality is < . Note that this means p L < 1 2 . There are three possibilities. Subcase 2aii-1: All three of the following hold: The voter's best response is thus unchanged. It is also symmetric with respect to x so type L is indifferent and can mix. In this case voter behavior in the initial equilibrium is asymmetric with respect to x, because there is at least one case, among the three (m = x, r = NC; m = x, r = NC; and m = x,r = C) for which the incumbent is re-elected for x = 1 and not for x = 0. However by Lemma 3, in the other information sets, the voter's belief is strictly higher for x = 1 than for x = 0 so the voter must be weakly more likely to re-elect the incumbent when x = 1 in those cases.
Thus type L must alway choose x = 1, which immediately implies that the belief ordering in Lemma 3 is > not <, a contradiction.
Thus we have shown that for any possible original equilibrium if we change from the original equilibrium p A and p L top A =p L = 1/2, voter best responses are unchanged and types L and A are indifferent between x ∈ {0, 1} and thus can mix. Because the voter's equilibrium strategies are still equilibrium strategies, type H's incentives are unchanged and there is an equilibrium with accountability withp A =p L = 1/2.
